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Behavior and Its Causes

Philosophical Foundations of Operant Psychology

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Kurzbeschreibung

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. While most philosophers and psychologists tend to believe that the rise of cognitive psychology has occurred concomitant with the decline of operant psychology, Terry L. Smith contends that nothing could be further from the truth. He maintains that operant psychology has discovered (and continues to discover) reasonably well-confirmed causal principles of intentional behavior, which go beyond what cognitive psychology can provide, while cognitive psychology, in tum, has the potential to supply analyses (and explanations) that account for them. Smith thus advances a surprising but nonetheless illuminating perspective for appreciating the place of operant conditioning within the discipline of psychology in this rich and fascinating work. J. H. F.

Details
Schlagworte

Titel: Behavior and Its Causes
Autoren/Herausgeber: T.L. Smith
Aus der Reihe: Studies in Cognitive Systems
Ausgabe: 1994

ISBN/EAN: 9780792328155

Seitenzahl: 267
Format: 23,4 x 15,6 cm
Produktform: Hardcover/Gebunden
Gewicht: 1,290 g
Sprache: Englisch

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